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The literature on wage gap has highlighted signiﬁcant gender differences in most industrial-
ized nations.1 This topic has been extensively studied with the aim of understanding whether
the gender pay gap is explained by gender differences in the distribution of personal char-
acteristics or due to a discriminatory remuneration of apparently identical characteristics.
This is a relevant issue from the policy perspective and different implications are drawn if
the source of the gender pay gap is found to be either the former or the latter.
Earlier work – see Altonji and Blank (1999) for a survey – focused on decomposing the
gender pay gap at the mean of the wage distribution in a part due to differences in charac-
teristics and in a part due to differences in the returns to those characteristics by using the
procedure developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Later, the attention has shifted
to the investigation of the degree to which gender pay gaps might vary across the wage dis-
tribution. Bonjour and Gerﬁn (2001) used 1991–1995 data for Switzerland and the hazard
function (HF) approach suggested by Donald et al. (2000) to estimate distributions in the
presence of covariates. They found that the gender wage gap is not constant throughout the
wage distribution but it is larger at the bottom, even after controlling for gender differences
in labour market characteristics. Albrecht et al. (2003), using the quantile regression (QR)
decomposition developed by Machado and Mata (2005), showed that in 1998 the Swedish
gender wage gap is instead larger at the top of the pay distribution.
Arulampalam et al. (2007) investigated this issue further for eleven European countries.
TheyusedharmonizeddatafromtheEuropeanCommunityHouseholdPanel(ECHP)forthe
period 1995–2001. They found that in ten of the eleven countries there is “glass ceiling”, i.e.
larger gender pay gap at the top of the distribution, and there is evidence of “sticky ﬂoor”,
i.e. larger gender pay gap at the bottom of the distribution, only in Italy and Spain.2 On the
basis of the cross-country comparison of the results, they speculate as to why glass ceilings
and sticky ﬂoors emerge, suggesting that differences in childcare provision and wage setting
institutions are potential determinants.
Different lines of reasoning have been provided to explain why the gender wage gap ex-
ists and why it widens at the bottom and/or at the top of the wage distribution, even when the
distribution of observed characteristics are the same across gender. It has been argued that
women might be perceived to have or might have a smaller work force attachment (Booth
and Francesconi, 2003), especially those at the bottom of the wage distribution. Hence,
trade unions could be less likely to represent or could differentially represent the interests of
female workers (Booth, 2009) and the anticipation of a more intermittent career might affect
investments in human capital (Manning and Swafﬁeld, 2008). Alternatively, women at the
bottom might have a smaller bargaining power or be more subject to ﬁrms’ market power
1See Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) for an international comparison of gender wage gaps and
Arulampalam et al. (2007) for a recent analysis of the gender pay gap in several European countries.
2The sticky ﬂoor and glass ceiling phenomena follow the deﬁnitions of Booth et al. (2003) and Albrecht et
al. (2003), respectively.
1than comparable men, as a result of social norms and family commitments whereby the
man’s career takes the precedence (Arulampalam et al., 2007). Bjerk (2008) theoretically
clariﬁes instead the reason why we should expect gender inequality of opportunity with re-
spect to hiring and promotion to the top jobs and, hence, glass ceilings. He shows that if
women have a more intermittent career, they will have fewer opportunities to signal their
skills and they will need more time to accumulate the number of positive signals required
for promotion to the top jobs.3
Most of these explanations for the presence of the gender wage gap and its heterogeneity
over the wage distribution hinge on gender differences in the work force attachment and,
thereby, in the propensity to participate to the labour market. A sizeable gender gap in
employment rates is observed in many countries and, therefore, sample selection into the
workforce might be a relevant issue to assess gender wage gaps. Suppose, for instance, that
those women that stay out of employment are those who would have got the lowest returns
from work and that, in case of participation, these lower returns would have been different
across the wage distribution. If so, we would underestimate and misrepresent the gender
wage gap compared to the case in which men and women would have the same propensity
to be at work. Moreover, as pointed out by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) and Albrecht et
al. (2009), selection correction is fundamental for meaningful international comparisons of
the gender wage gap, especially if gender gaps in employment rates are very different across
countries.
Given that sample selection might be an important issue in this framework, it is sur-
prising that, apart from Albrecht et al. (2009) who adjusted the gender wage gap for the
selectivity into full-time work, there are no studies that correct the gender gap across the
wage distribution for the selection due to work force participation. In the literature there is
also lack of studies based on recent data (e.g. Arulampalam et al. (2007) used the ECHP
survey which took place at the end of the 90s). In this paper we try to ﬁll these gaps, from
both the methodological and the empirical points of view. With regard to the former, we
propose a new ﬂexible estimator of distribution functions in the presence of covariates and
sample selection. We describe a simulation algorithm to decompose the gender pay gap
across the wage distribution into the effect due to different distributions of characteristics
and to different returns to those characteristics. Empirically, the proposed approach is illus-
trated by investigating the recent gender wage gap in Italy, a country where the employment
3Other reasons for the glass ceilings can be found in the institutional setting. Albrecht et al. (2003) justify
the glass ceiling phenomenon in Sweden on the basis of the parental leave and the daycare system which are
likely to provide incentives to be in the work force but to discourage strong career commitment. Sociological
and psychological factors might also favour men over women, in particular at the top of the wage distribution.
Women might be less willing to bargain over offered wages, since more grateful for the job offer. Because
of stereotypes, women might not be seen as potential leaders and, when they are, they might be evaluated
less favourably. Women might be less risk adverse, less inclined to competition, and give priority to other job
features over the wage. See Booth (2009) for a detailed discussion on the relationship between psychological
and sociological factors and the gender pay gap and glass ceiling phenomena.
2rate between men and women differs substantially.4
How does our approach compare with the methodological literature on gender pay gap?
First, we develop a procedure that extends and generalizes the Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sition of effects on mean wages to the entire wage distribution in the presence of sample
selection. Second, our approach is very much in the spirit of Albrecht et al. (2009), who
adapted the Machado-Mata (MM) procedure to take advantage of the Buchinsky (1998)
selection correction method for QR.5 However, in this paper, we operate within the HF
framework proposed by Donald et al. (2000). We beneﬁt therefore of a ﬂexible method for
density estimation in the presence of covariates that, differently from QR, avoids the po-
tential inconsistency of predicting lower quantiles larger than higher quantiles for a given
covariate vector. Lastly, we improve upon the HF approaches of Donald et al. (2000) and
Bonjour and Gerﬁn (2001)6 in that we correct for sample selection.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the econometric approach used
to estimate distributions in the presence of covariates and sample selection and presents
the simulation algorithms to recover marginal and counterfactual distributions. Section 3
illustrates our approach by analysing the gender pay gap in Italy on the basis of the Euro-
pean Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) panel data. Section 4
concludes.
2 Modelling Wage Distributions in the Presence of Covari-
ates and Sample Selection
The econometric analysis is designed keeping in mind that we desire an estimation strategy
that i) is ﬂexible in the way covariates affect the shape of the wage density function; ii)
is ﬂexible in the way sample selection is controlled for; iii) is tractable and allows to test
for sample selection when estimating wage densities; iv) returns, for any set of individual
characteristics, estimated probabilities in the interval [0;1] and a wage density function that
integrates to one.
Different non/semi-parametric estimators have been proposed to model wage distribu-
tions in the presence of covariates. Firstly, DiNardo et al. (1996) adapted kernel density
estimator to the case in which sample weights are attached to each observation. Coun-
4The Italian employment rate for the population aged 25–54 was 86.5% for men and 58.1% for women in
2005. TheseﬁguresareavailableintheInternetathttp://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/-
home.
5See also Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) who analyse for EU countries and the US the gender wage gap
at the median of the distribution by correcting for selection into the work force. Blundell et al. (2007) deal
with nonrandom selection into employment by developing bounds around the wage distribution on the basis
of restrictions motivated from economic theory.
6See also Behr and Pötter (2009), who analyse the differences in the wage distributions between the USA
and Germany by way of the HF approach but less ﬂexible than that suggested by Donald et al. (2000).
3terfactual densities are estimated by “re-weighting” functions, which depend on different
covariates distribution between populations. Fortin and Lemieux (1998) divided the wage
support in small intervals and estimated the probability of being in each wage interval using
an ordered response (probit) model. Once the model is estimated, counterfactual distribu-
tions can be predicted by playing with covariates and/or estimated coefﬁcients of the ordered
response model. Donald et al. (2000) and Bonjour and Gerﬁn (2001) considered wage dis-
tributions as if they were duration distributions and applied HF based estimation techniques.
Since there is a one-to-one relationship between hazard and density functions, this approach
consists in specifying and estimating a ﬂexible wage hazard function, so as to recover the
corresponding conditional wage distribution from the estimated parameters.7 Finally, the
most common method to estimate distributions in the presence of covariates, is QR (e.g.
Buchinsky, 1994, 1998) followed by Machado and Mata’s (2005) simulation algorithm to
carry out counterfactual comparisons of densities.
The approach used here for modelling wage distributions in the presence of covariates
and sample selection is built on Donald et al. (2000) and Bonjour and Gerﬁn (2001). Dif-
ferently from them, we propose a semi-parametric method to correct the wage distribution
estimates for endogenous selection process into the work force. Hence, this paper is related
to the previous literature by extending Donald et al. (2000) and Bonjour and Gerﬁn (2001)
to control for sample selection, along the same lines as Albrecht et al. (2009) adapted the
Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition to account for selection into full-time employ-
ment.
In Subsection 2.1 the concept of wage hazard function is introduced. Subsection 2.2 fo-
cuseson speciﬁcationissuesand dealswiththe derivationofthe likelihoodfunction. Finally,
Subsection 2.3 clariﬁes how counterfactual densities are derived once we have an estimate
of the wage density in the presence of covariates and sample selection.
2.1 Hazard Function Based Approach
Consider a panel data setting where t is the time indicator, with t = 1;2;:::;T.8 We assume
thatallindividualdifferencesinthewagedistributioncanbecharacterizedbyobservedchar-
acteristics xt and an individual ﬁxed-effect v. For covariate xt and individual heterogeneity
v there is a positive random variable Wt with associated probability and cumulative density








7The duration literature interpretation of the hazard function does not apply in this context. The interest
relies rather in the impact of individual characteristics on hazard functions and, thereby, on density functions.
8We suppress the individual indicator for the sake of clarity.
4where S(wtjxt;v) is the survivor function, i.e. the probability of being paid at least a wage
wt. We specify the hazard function as
(wtjxt;v) = ht(wtjxt)v; (2)
where ht is the structural wage hazard function at time t. We impose now the following
regularity conditions on ht and v:
A1 Ht(wtjxt) =
R wt
0 ht(sjxt)ds < 1 is non-negative, differentiable, and strictly increas-
ing, 8t = 1;2;:::;T;
A2 v is non-negative with distribution function G.
Under assumptions A1 and A2, Honoré (1993, Theorem 1) shows that, from panel data,
the unobserved heterogeneity distribution G and the structural hazard functions ht, 8t =
1;2;:::;T, are non-parametrically identiﬁed. We stress here the importance of non-parame-
tric model identiﬁcation. If the model is not identiﬁed without arbitrary parametric assump-
tions, parametric speciﬁcation would play a crucial role in inference and the results would
thereby be intrinsically suspect. In the empirical analysis that follows, we do not need to
rely on parametric restrictions for identiﬁcation purposes.
It is noteworthy to remark that while in the duration literature the hazard function is
usually assumed to have a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) form, where the structural
hazard function factors into separate functions of duration and covariates, here we do need it
for identiﬁcation and we will not impose it in the empirical speciﬁcation. In this framework
a MPH model would imply the strong restriction that covariates have the same impact on the
baseline wage hazard function across all the wage support. As in Donald et al. (2000), we
willallowthecovariateeffecttobedifferentoverthewagesupport, atdifferentpercentilesof
the unconditional wage distribution. Moreover, assumption A2 does not require a particular
mixing distribution9 and the independence assumption between G and xt is not needed for
identiﬁcation.10
2.2 Model Speciﬁcation and Likelihood Function
An ideal way to avoid any kind of parametric assumption on the functional form of ht
would be to fully non-parametrically estimate it by using kernel-density estimation for each
possible combination of covariate values. However, as soon as the number of covariates
9Note also that the structural wage hazard function ht is not required to be the same over time and is in
principle allowed to take a completely different shape when t changes. In the empirical application we are
however going to put some restrictions on the way in which ht varies over time for the sake of reducing the
dimensionality of the problem: ht will be allowed to change over time by the introduction of a time dummy
among the set of regressors xt.
10As pointed out by Honoré (1993), identiﬁcation is attained even in the case in which the distribution of v
depends on xt.
5increase or a continuous covariate is introduced, the cell-sizes become too small to do useful
inference. So we are going to put some parametric restrictions on ht in order to have a
tractable but still ﬂexible conditional density estimator. Following Donald et al. (2000) and
Gritz and MaCurdy (1992), we partition the range of W into P intervals and we allow the
covariate effects to vary over these intervals. The variation is with respect to a baseline wage
hazard function h0(wt) that, in order to avoid too strict parametric assumptions, is assumed





H) the pth wage interval over which
the covariate effect is assumed to be constant (i.e. proportional to the baseline wage hazard
function), such that 
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where 1() is the indicator function.
As said, h0(wt) is the piecewise constant baseline wage hazard function. More in details
we divided the wage support into J intervals Ij = [wj 1;wj), where j = 1;:::;J, w0 <
w1 < ::: < wJ, w0 = 0, and wJ = 1. We choose the width of the wage baseline
segments by ﬁxing wJ 1 to the 99th percentile of the unconditional wage distribution and
by dividing the wage support between w0 and wJ 1 in 70 equally spaced intervals. Our
choice of the number of the baseline segments is somewhat arbitrary but it allows us to
have a narrow segment width11 and therefore suitable for ﬂexibly approximating all possible
density functions. This reduces the model selection problem to the choice of P (and, as we
will see, to the number of points of support of the discrete distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity). In order to reduce the risk of over-ﬁtting bias and to have a reasonable
trade-off between model parsimony and ﬁt to the data at hand, we choose P by looking at
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In turned out that P = 8 for men and P = 10 for




P ] percentiles of the unconditional wage distribution.
To construct the contribution to the likelihood function of the wage wt that lies in the
baseline segment [wj 1;wj), note that the probability of observing a wage in such a segment
is





11The segment width is around 0.27e for both men and women.








is the wage survivor function, i.e. the probability of observing a wage at least as large as
the upper limit of the jth segment. Since the wage hazard function is piecewise constant
and the covariate effect does not change within the baseline segments,12 the survivor func-
tion reduces to S(wtjxt;v) 
Qj
s=0 exp[ (wsjxt;v)], s 2 N0. Thereby, the difference in
survivor functions in (4) is the contribution to the likelihood function of wages lying on the
piecewise constant baseline segment [wj 1;wj). If the wage value is top-coded, i.e. if it is
larger than the 99th percentile of the wage distribution, it is treated as a right censored ob-
servation. The corresponding contribution to the likelihood function is the probability that




w) = S(wJ 1=99thjxt;v): (5)
However, if we are interested in comparing wages of women to those of men, we have so
far faced only a part of the story. Since the selection process into the work force is likely to
be structurally different for women compared to men, it has to be taken into account when
evaluating compositional issues otherwise preventing us from understanding the genuine
nature of the gender wage gap. In other words, there are reasons to believe that the proba-
bility of being employed is related to the likelihood of being paid a certain wage. Assume
for instance that women who decide not to participate are those who would get the lowest
earnings from work and that such a relation is ignored. Then the observed gender wage gap
across the distribution would be underestimated compared to the case of men and women
having the same propensity to be at work.
Correcting for nonrandom sampling has been central to empirical studies in labour eco-
nomics since the seminal work of Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974). Parametric and
semi/non-parametric methods have been proposed in the selection bias literature.13 By way
of a semi-parametric approach, we correct now the likelihood function for the participation
probability.
Let us deﬁne yit the scalar indicator variable denoting individual i’s employment status
at time t and zit the set of explanatory variables explaining participation. The probability
model for work participation is empirically speciﬁed using a discrete mixture logit model:
yit = 1[z
0
it + "i + uit > 0] (6)
where"i isunobservedheterogeneityanduit istheidiosyncraticerrortermwhichisassumed
12Note however that they are allowed to vary across baseline segments.
13See, e.g., Vella (1998) for a survey on methods to estimate models with sample selection bias.
7to have a logistic distribution, denoted by .














As a matter of fact, we cannot use directly this density to estimate  because vi and "i are
not observed. For each individual i, the likelihood contribution Li is obtained by integrating





The log-likelihood function sums the logarithm of this expression over all the individuals
(employed and nonemployed) in the sample.14
In order to avoid too strict parametric assumptions on the joint distribution of v and
", it is approximated by means of a bivariate discrete distribution (Heckman and Singer,
1984) with a ﬁxed number of support points, which have unknown locations and probability
masses. We assume that (v;") has four probability points. The corresponding probability
masses are deﬁned as follows:
p1  Pr(v = v1;" = "1) p2  Pr(v = v2;" = "1)
p3  Pr(v = v1;" = "2) p4  Pr(v = v2;" = "2) = 1   p1   p2   p3:
In this case, four points of support and three probability masses are to be estimated. The





with 4 = 0:
Note that v and " are independent if and only if p1p4 = p2p3 (see Van den Berg et al., 1994;
Van den Berg and Lindeboom, 1998), making it easy to test for sample selection.
2.3 Marginal Densities and Decomposition of Distribution Functions
In the application below, we start by estimating a simpler model that does not take into ac-
count sample selection. By doing so, we can compare our decomposition technique to a
14In principle, given the error term assumption on "it, the panel data framework, and the integration over the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, identiﬁcation is achieved without exclusion restrictions. However, in
the empirical application we use some exclusion restrictions in line with those often used in the labour supply
literature (see, e.g., Mroz, 1987): dummy indicators for the number of children by different age groups and
the number of members in the household.
8standard MM decomposition and we can see what the empirical ﬁndings would have been
if sample selection had not been taken into account. Subsequently, we estimate the model
with sample selection as described above. Therefore, in this subsection, we present two sim-
ulation algorithms: the ﬁrst one to derive the marginal densities implied by the conditional
model that omits sample selection; the second one that controls for sample selection.
2.3.1 Marginal and Counterfactual Densities without Sample Selection
Once the male and female hazard functions that fully characterize the conditional wage
densities are estimated ignoring sample selection, we generate the corresponding marginal
densities by means of the following simulation algorithm, which is run once for men and
once for women:
1. Draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming normality around the point estimates
b  with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimated one.
2. Generate N individuals by drawing N times a vector x of covariates from the empirical
distribution of covariates.15
3. For each baseline wage interval [wj 1;wj) with j = 1;:::;70, we compute the pre-
dicted conditional probability of getting a wage within that interval from the following
theoretical conditional probability:
Pr(wj 1  Wt < wjjWt  wj 1;xit) = 1   exp[ (wjjxit)]:
For i = 1;:::;N and for j = 1;:::;J we draw ij from a standard uniform distri-
bution. Starting from j = 1, if the predicted probability 1   exp[ b (w1jxit)] > i1,
individual i is assigned a random wage in [w0;w1). If not, repeat the lottery for the
next wage baseline segment, i.e. for j = 2. The lottery for individual i is stopped
when inequality 1   exp[ b (wjjxit)] > ij is satisﬁed.16
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 R = 999 times.
With marginal densities in hands for men and women, the basic idea of the decomposi-
tion of the gender pay gap is based on recovering the counterfactual density that would have
prevailed if female employees had the same distribution of characteristics as male employ-
ees, that is Z
x2
fF(wjx;F)dFM(x); (8)
15As in Machado and Mata (2005), in this step a random sample of the covariates from an appropriate
distribution is drawn, allowing to “integrate x out” and get a sample from the marginal.
16Note that, by doing so, we can only simulate an interval on which the wage is located. Given that each
interval is quite small and equal to 0.27e, a point value is randomly assigned between the lower and upper
bound of the interval without losing too much in terms of precision.
9where the subscripts F and M stand for female and male, respectively. The counterfactual
marginal density in (8) is obtained by repeating the simulation algorithm for women with
step 2 revised so that the covariate vectors are drawn from the empirical covariate distribu-
tion of male employees.
The basic idea of the procedure is an alternative way of extending Oaxaca’s (1973)
decomposition of effects on mean wages to the entire wage distribution and is in line with
the underlying idea of Machado and Mata (2005). In the next subsection, we explain how,
as in Albrecht et al. (2009), we incorporated sample selection due to work participation in
the gender pay gap decomposition.
2.3.2 Marginal and Counterfactual Densities with Sample Selection
Let A denote all women (men) and B the women (men) who actually work.17 Deﬁne
WA the counterfactual random variable indicating the wage that a woman would earn if
she worked. The conditional wage density is characterized by a parameter vector w
A, i.e.
f(WAjxA;vA;w
A). The problem is that WA is not observed for individuals who do not
work. We can only observe the realization of the random variable WB, which represents the
wage earned by those women who actually work. By way of the sample selection correction
presented in Subsection 2.2, we recover the true shape of the wage distribution on the basis






where the weights are the probabilities of being at work, YB is the participation indicator,
and vB and "B are allowed to be correlated.
The extension of the previous algorithm to generate marginal densities in the presence
of sample selection proceeds as follows:
1. Draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming normality around the point estimates
b A with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimated one.
2. Generate N individuals by drawing N times: i) a vector xA of covariates from the
empirical distribution of covariates among all women (men);18 ii) unobserved charac-
teristics from the estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity b G.
3. Per each baseline wage interval [wj 1;wj) with j = 1;:::;70, we compute the pre-
dicted conditional probability of getting a wage within that interval from the following
theoretical conditional probability:
Pr(wj 1  Wt < wjjWt  wj 1;xAit;vAi) = 1   exp[ (wjjxAit;vAi)]:
17The notation in this subsection is inspired by the one in Albrecht et al. (2009).
18Work speciﬁc covariates are drawn from the empirical distribution conditional on work participation.
10For i = 1;:::;N and for j = 1;:::;J we draw ij from a standard uniform distribu-
tion. Starting from j = 1, if the predicted probability 1 exp[ b (w1jxAit;b vAi)] > i1,
individual i is assigned a random wage in [w0;w1). If not, repeat the lottery for the
next wage baseline segment. The lottery for individual i is stopped when inequality
1   exp[ b (wjjxAit;b vAi)] > ij is satisﬁed.
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 R = 999 times.
This procedure simulates (wo)men’s wage densities that would have prevailed if all
(wo)men had been at work. This is done by taking into account that the distribution of
individual characteristics across all the population is not the same as the one across people
at work.
As in Subsection 2.3.1, the counterfactual female wage density that we would expect if






is obtained by repeating the above simulation algorithm for women with step 2 revised so
that the covariate vectors are drawn from the empirical covariate distribution of all men.
3 Application: Gender Wage Gap in Italy
3.1 Data
Our data are from the EU-SILC panel. It is a rotating panel survey based on harmonised
methodology and deﬁnitions across most members of the European Union.19 The topics
covered by the survey are living conditions, income, social exclusion, housing, work, de-
mography, and education. We select data for Italy, where the survey is conducted on a yearly
basis by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) under the coordination of Eurostat. The
longitudinal EU-SILC data comprise a number of individual records that range from 31,000
to about 43,000 per year over the time window 2004–2006.
Since information on earnings is retrospectively collected (information on income at
time t is collected at time t + 1), we lose one time period (2006). In order to avoid to
get mixed up with early retirement and education enrolment issues, we exclude from our
analysis individuals under the age of 25 years and over the age of 55 years. We also drop in-
dividuals that are in army, self-employed, inactive, or with missing values for some variables
used in the econometric analysis. Finally, individuals lying in the ﬁrst or last percentiles of
the wage or working hours distributions are excluded from the sample. Considering both
the non-employed and the employed, we are left with 10,841 female observations and 8,699
19See Eurostat (2004) for further and technical details about the EU-SILC data.
11male observations over the period 2004–2005. The total number of wage observations is
7,612(5,910) for (wo)men.
Almost all active men, 87.5%, are at work, whilst 54.5% of the active women are em-
ployed. The deﬁnitions of employment and non-employment do not match the ILO deﬁ-
nition. In the EU-SILC questionnaire, the respondents are indeed asked to self-deﬁne the
main economic status in the current year.20
The dependent variable is the net hourly wage in the respondent’s main job, deﬂated to
2004 prices. The deﬂator is the Consumer Price Index (CPI), gathered by ISTAT.21 Table
1 reports summary statistics of the net hourly wage disaggregated by gender in 2004 and
2005. Men are paid per hour and on average more than women, e9.4 against e9. Figure 1
plots the kernel estimate of the wage density for men and women. It shows that the hourly
wage distribution is positively skewed both for men and women. By contrasting the male
and female kernel density estimates, we get a visual inspection of the gender pay gap, which
does not seem to be constant over the wage distribution: it is well perceived at the bottom
and in the middle of the wage support, but it disappears at the top of the distribution. Table
2 sheds further light on this raw evidence: the raw gender pay gap goes from almost 10% at
the bottom of the distribution to 5% at the median and to zero at the 95th percentile of the
wage distribution.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Net Hourly Wage by Gen-
der in Italy, 2004–2005
Men Women Overall
Hourly wage (e)(a) Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
2004 9.333 3.420 8.898 3.495 9.142 3.459
2005 9.413 3.583 9.013 3.590 9.239 3.591
Overall 9.380 3.517 8.966 3.552 9.199 3.538
(a) Wages are in constant prices (2004 prices). They are deﬂated by using the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI), gathered by ISTAT.
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis
computed on the subsample of the employed and disaggregated by year. Table 4 displays
instead descriptive statistics over the total population in our sample.
Wedistinguishbetweenthreeagegroups: youngworkers(25–35yearsold), middleaged
workers (35–45 years old), and older workers (45–55 years old). In the empirical analysis
below, we do not include among the covariates any measure of experience. In a ﬁrst stage,
20The question PL030 is the variable containing information on the self-deﬁned economic status. People are
asked whether they are working, unemployed, students, in retirement, disabled, in military service, or fulﬁlling
domestic task.
21The net hourly wage is computed starting from the employees’ yearly net cash income, variable PY010N,
and using the number of months at work, obtained from variables PL210A-PL210L, and the number of hours
usually worked per week, PL060. Considering that on average there are 4.345 weeks in a month, the hourly
wage is therefore computed as follows: w = PY010N=(# of months at work  PL060  4:345).
12Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates for Net Hourly Wage
Table 2: Raw Gender Wage Gap in Italy, 2004–2005
2004 2005 Overall
Proportion of women .439 .436 .437
Mean .048 .043 .045
5th percentile .095 .094 .097
10th percentile .084 .072 .076
25th percentile .081 .059 .066
50th percentile .057 .049 .053
75th percentile .034 .048 .040
90th percentile .016 .014 .013
95th percentile .022 -.009 .001
Note: The raw wage gap is measured as the difference between the log male
hourly wage and the log female hourly wage.
13we did include in the model speciﬁcation real experience and/or potential experience, but
they turned out to be very correlated with age and they did not generate any improvement in
terms of likelihood. They were thereby removed from the set of covariates.
Table 3: Summary Statistics by Gender and Year for Employees
2004 2005
Male Female Male Female
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Age
[25;35) .297 .457 .317 .465 .286 .452 .294 .456
[35;45) .373 .484 .383 .486 .366 .482 .386 .487
[45;55] .329 .470 .300 .458 .348 .476 .320 .467
Education(a)
None, elementary, or lower secondary .447 .497 .294 .456 .431 .495 .290 .454
Upper secondary .393 .488 .448 .497 .403 .491 .442 .497
Post secondary or tertiary .160 .367 .257 .437 .166 .372 .268 .443
Area of residence
North .521 .500 .582 .493 .493 .500 .548 .498
Centre .229 .420 .236 .425 .238 .426 .252 .434
South .250 .433 .182 .386 .270 .444 .200 .400
Bad health(b) .247 .431 .263 .440 .232 .422 .258 .438
Married .668 .471 .645 .479 .661 .474 .629 .483
City(c) .340 .474 .352 .478 .324 .468 .346 .476
Part time worker .040 .195 .296 .456 .039 .195 .304 .460
White-collar high-skilled worker(d) .302 .459 .435 .496 .303 .460 .435 .496
White-collar low-skilled worker(d) .219 .414 .330 .470 .215 .411 .346 .476
Blue-collar high-skilled worker(d) .230 .421 .069 .253 .241 .428 .068 .251
Blue-collar low-skilled worker(d) .248 .432 .167 .373 .240 .427 .152 .359
Temporary contract .083 .276 .136 .343 .075 .263 .128 .334
Observations 3,103 2,432 4,509 3,478
(a) Educational dummy indicators refer to the highest and successfully completed educational attainment of a person. The
educational classiﬁcation used to build these indicators is the ISCED-97.
(b) “Bad health” is a dummy indicator based on self-perceived health. It is equal to one if the individual declares that her
health is in a fair, rather bad, or bad conditions. It is equal to zero, if the answer is either good or rather good condition.
(c) “City” is a dummy indicator equal to one if the individual lives in a densely populated area, i.e. an area with a density
superior to 500 inhabitants per square kilometre and a total population larger than 50,000 inhabitants.
(d) These occupational indicators are built on the basis of the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupation (ISCO
88). Taking the one-digit ISCO categories, the white-collar high skilled indicator corresponds to categories 1 up to 3; the
white-collar low skilled indicator corresponds to categories 4 and 5; the blue-collar high skilled indicator corresponds to
categories 6 and 7; the blue-collar low skilled indicator corresponds to categories 8 and 9.
Educational variables are deﬁned according to UNESCO’s International Standard Clas-
siﬁcation of Education (ISCED). The EU-SILC distinguishes between education completed
to the lower secondary stage (ISCED 0-2), upper secondary education(ISCED 3), and post-
secondary or tertiary education (ISCED 5-7). In our sample working women are more edu-
cated than men, and this tendency is even stronger in 2005, when 27% of working women
had at least a post secondary education attainment against 17% of working men. The dis-
crepancy almost disappears on the full sample of employed and non-employed individuals:
18% of women has at least a post secondary education attainment against 16% of men. This
shows that women with low education attainment have a lower propensity to be at work than
their male counterpart.
14Table 4: Summary Statistics by Gender for the Whole
Population (Employed and Non-Employed)
Male Female
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Age
[25;35) .309 .462 .281 .450
[35;45) .363 .481 .379 .485
[45;55] .329 .470 .340 .474
Education(a)
None, elementary, or lower secondary .458 .498 .441 .497
Upper secondary .383 .486 .375 .484
Post secondary or tertiary .159 .366 .184 .388
Area of residence
North .477 .499 .462 .499
Centre .225 .418 .227 .419
South .298 .457 .311 .463
Bad health(b) .246 .430 .286 .452
Married .624 .484 .716 .451
City(c) .334 .472 .341 .474
Part time worker(d) .040 .361 .301 .459
White-collar high-skilled worker(d) .303 .460 .435 .496
White-collar low-skilled worker(d) .217 .412 .339 .473
Blue-collar high-skilled worker(d) .237 .425 .068 .252
Blue-collar low-skilled worker(d) .244 .429 .158 .365
Temporary worker(d) .078 .268 .131 .338
Number of household members 3.312 1.210 3.379 1.158
Number of children by age
[0;3) years old .109 .326 .104 .318
[3;6) years old .127 .354 .126 .350
[6;12) years old .251 .521 .275 .538
Employed .875 .331 .545 .498
Time dummy for 2004 .409 .492 .407 .491
Observations 8,699 10,841
(a), (b), (c) See footnotes (a), (b), (c) of Table 3.
(d) These are variables observed only for the employed. The corresponding num-
ber of observations is not therefore given by the ﬁgures at the bottom of the table
but equal to 7,612 for men and 5,910 for women.
15Threedummyvariablesforthegeographicalareaofresidence(North, Centre, andSouth)
are included in the model speciﬁcation. Around one half of the sample lives in the North
of Italy and the rest is equally distributed in the Centre and South. A dummy indicator
accounting for self-perceived health tries to capture the effect of health status (even if sub-
jective or perceived) on wages and propensity to work. Indicators for marital status and
living in a densely populated area are included in the model, as likely to affect earnings and
job opportunities.
Finally, a set of covariates are used to capture job heterogeneity. We included dummy
indicators for part-time and temporary jobs. Women are more frequently employed in these
jobs than men. Using the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO-88),
we built a set of binary indicators aimed at capturing task heterogeneity.22 Taking the one-
digit ISCO categories, the white-collar high skilled indicator corresponds to categories 1 up
to 3; the white-collar low skilled indicator corresponds to categories 4 and 5; the blue-collar
high skilled indicator corresponds to categories 6 and 7; the blue-collar low skilled indicator
corresponds to categories 8 and 9. Women are more likely to be white collar workers. Only
23% of the women at work are blue collar workers, whereas 48% of male employees are
blue collar workers.
3.2 Estimation Results
This subsection reports and comments on the impact of the regressors on the male and fe-
male wage hazard functions and, thereby, on the wage distribution functions. As mentioned
in Subsection 2.2, the impact of covariates on the shape of the wage density functions is
ﬂexibly modelled, so that it can be different over the wage support. In other words, analo-
gously to QR, the covariates can have different effects at different percentiles of the wage
distribution. Hence, Tables 5 and 6 report the effects of the covariates at selected percentiles
for men and women, respectively.
Three points are worthy being remarked before moving through the estimation results.
First, Tables 5 and 6 display selection-corrected estimation results.23 The Log-likelihood
Ratio (LR) tests reported at the end of these tables indicate that the null hypothesis of no
sample selection can be rejected quite conﬁdently, especially for women. Second, the esti-
mated coefﬁcients inform us about the covariate impact on the wage hazard rate: individual
characteristics that have a negative effect on the wage hazard rate reduce the probability of
getting a low wage. Individuals holding these characteristics are therefore more likely to
get a higher wage with respect to the reference group. Third, a LR test for constant covari-
ates coefﬁcients over the wage support largely rejects the null hypothesis both for men and
women: a standard proportional hazard speciﬁcation like in Behr and Pötter (2009) would
have been too restrictive.
22See Dumont (2006) for a discussion on the ability of such indicators in capturing skills levels.
23Coefﬁcients estimates without sample selection are not reported in the paper but available upon request.
16Education plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining the male and female wage distributions
and, as expected, higher education attainments are associated with higher wages. This is
especially true at the 25th percentile of the wage distribution, both for men and women. The
relevance of education decreases at the top of the wage distributions, especially for men.
Table 5: Coefﬁcient Estimates of the Covariates with Correction for Selectivity at Selected
Percentiles of the Wage Distribution – Men
Percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Education – Reference: None, elementary, or lower secondary
Upper secondary -.447*** .070 -.654*** .078 -.299*** .089 -.119 .075 .068 .089
Post secondary or tertiary -.895*** .127 -1.149*** .126 -.918*** .132 -.608*** .103 -.430*** .102
Age – Reference: [45;55]
[25;35) 1.115*** .092 1.367*** .101 .936*** .113 .630*** .098 .217* .114
[35;45) .300*** .088 .605*** .084 .404*** .092 .440*** .071 .073 .067
Occupation – Reference: High skilled & white collar
Low skilled & white collar .203* .106 .579*** .109 .826*** .112 .463*** .079 .268*** .082
High skilled & blue collar .837*** .100 1.540*** .108 1.571*** .126 .304*** .112 .258** .123
Low skilled & blue collar .695*** .101 1.227*** .106 1.630*** .117 .377*** .099 .187 .124
Area of residence – Reference: North
Centre .626*** .083 .373*** .089 .286*** .093 .044 .079 .020 .082
South 1.173*** .077 .540*** .084 .231** .097 -.209** .084 .055 .077
Bad health .100 .080 .135* .079 .083 .090 .190** .078 .013 .082
Married -.698*** .070 -.594*** .079 -.096 .096 -.128* .077 .139* .077
Temporary contract 1.013*** .086 .723*** .131 .316* .174 -.109 .205 -.137 .174
City -.102 .071 -.279*** .074 -.216** .084 -.019 .068 -.032 .066
Part-time -.499*** .161 -1.518*** .246 -1.493*** .249 -1.383*** .205 -.520*** .128
Year 2004 .036 .074 .005 .075 .082 .085 .094 .081 .016 .081
Log-likelihood -29,020.0
Observations 5,770
LR test for sample selection, H0: p1p4 = p2p3 2(1)=5.8, p-value=.016
LR test against PH assumption, H0: p =  2(105)=866.4, p-value=.000
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Getting older increases the probability of getting high wages. This emphasizes a dis-
advantage for younger men and women to be located at the top of the wage distribution.
However, work experience is likely to play a role in partly explaining the age effect. As
mentioned in Section 3.1, we do not include work experience among the covariates: since
work experience is strongly correlated with age, we were not able to improve in terms of
the likelihood by including it among the set of regressors. If follows that the decomposition
results presented in the next subsection are not sensitive to the exclusion of work experience
from the model speciﬁcation.
Moving on to task heterogeneity, we note that high skilled and white collar occupations
are associated with higher wages, both for men and women. In term of signiﬁcance, these
skill-level indicators seem to be more relevant for men than for women. For women, tasks
heterogeneity appears to lose any explanatory power at the top of the wage distribution and
the standard errors associated to the task indicators tend to explode, especially if compared
17to the male counterpart. This is likely due to a different composition of the female work
force at the top jobs, which is relatively more homogeneous and richer in high skilled and
white collar workers than the male work force.
Table 6: Coefﬁcient Estimates of the Covariates with Correction for Selectivity at Selected
Percentiles of the Wage Distribution – Women
Percentiles 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Education – Reference: None, elementary, or lower secondary
Upper secondary -.790*** .102 -1.025*** .099 -.680*** .127 -.418*** .119 .203 .213
Post secondary or tertiary -1.059*** .140 -1.569*** .133 -1.322*** .167 -.887*** .135 -.502** .217
Age – Reference: [45;55]
[25;35) .919*** .126 1.298*** .112 1.131*** .140 .531*** .119 -.166 .139
[35;45) .351*** .120 .445*** .109 .511*** .129 .182* .097 .135 .097
Occupation – Reference: High skilled & white collar
Low skilled & white collar .805*** .121 .739*** .101 1.058*** .122 .382*** .092 -.219 .132
High skilled & blue collar 1.382*** .159 1.691*** .159 1.594*** .219 -.264 .333 .059 .388
Low skilled & blue collar 1.533*** .132 1.563*** .126 1.526*** .175 .176 .186 .050 .294
Area of residence – Reference: North
Centre .538*** .110 .280*** .095 .188 .121 -.045 .098 .104 .102
South 1.414*** .105 .460*** .112 .056 .147 -.270** .117 -.140 .101
Bad health -.096 .107 .031 .097 .070 .115 .161* .096 .026 .100
Married -.273*** .096 -.162* .084 -.196* .107 -.073 .087 -.216** .100
Temporary contract .457*** .106 .191 .117 .188 .157 -.355** .168 -.020 .137
City -.154 .101 -.189** .086 -.214** .107 -.028 .085 -.162* .088
Part-time .039 .098 -.826*** .097 -.985*** .128 -1.117*** .103 -.072 .089
Year 2004 .060 .099 -.026 .092 -.052 .107 -.020 .093 .110 .109
Log-likelihood -25,654.7
Observations 7,156
LR test for sample selection, H0: p1p4 = p2p3 2(1)=12.3, p-value=.000
LR test against PH assumption, H0: p =  2(135)=859.6, p-value=.000
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
We ﬁnd geographical differentials in the distribution of wages, characterized by relevant
pay disadvantages in the Centre and especially in the South of Italy. The geographical
differentials represent a structural feature of the Italian labour market. This is also reﬂected
in other economic indicators, for instance, the sizeable geographical gaps in employment
rates.24 Nevertheless, the geographical pay gaps seem to disappear at the top of the wage
distribution, both for men and women. The top jobs are equally paid across the country
and this might reﬂect a different composition of the work force across areas with respect
to public/private employment. However, this information is not in the data and this issue
cannot be investigated further.
With regard to the remaining covariates, subjective (or perceived) health status, indica-
tors for marital status, and living in a densely populated area do not affect so much earnings.
24TheItalianunemploymentrateforthepopulationaged25-54was78.8%intheNorth, 75.3%intheCentre,
and 56.8% in the South of Italy in 2005. These ﬁgures are available in the Internet at http://epp.eurostat.ec.-
europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home.
18Being employed with a temporary contract is associated with low wages at the bottom (for
men and women) and the middle (for men) of the wage distribution. Part-time jobs seem to
be better paid on hourly basis, especially for men. This is likely to be due to the fact that men
are more willing than women to get a part-time job only when it can ensure a satisfactory
level of income. Finally, the reference year of our estimates is 2005 and a time indicator
for 2004 is instead included in the model speciﬁcation. This indicator variable has always a
small and insigniﬁcant impact on the wage hazard rate, both for men and women. It suggests
that the shape of the wage distributions did not change signiﬁcantly between 2004 and 2005.
In general, the estimation results emphasize the relevance of education, age, and geo-
graphical partition of residence to explain the shape of male and female wage distributions.
These characteristics, together with the gender gap, are classiﬁed by the literature as key
dimensions of heterogeneity of the Italian labour market.25.
3.3 Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap
We present now the decomposition of the gender pay gap, so as to account for gender differ-
ences in labour market characteristics and work force attachment. We proceed in two steps.
First, we look at the estimated gender wage gap decomposition without correction for selec-
tivity. At this stage, the marginal and counterfactual densities are recovered by following the
simulation algorithm described in Subsection 2.3.1; we also compare the empirical ﬁndings
from our HF based decomposition to those that would have been obtained from a standard
MM decomposition based on QR. Second, we look at the decomposition with selection cor-
rection, by way of the simulation algorithm described in Subsection 2.3.2. This permits to
assess whether and how the gender wage gap, given the same distribution of labour market
characteristics, changes after taking into account selection into the work force. Figure 2 re-
ports the decomposition at the ﬁrst step. Figure 3 displays the decomposition at the second
step, i.e. with selection correction.
The central lines of Figure 2 plot the total wage gaps after recovering the marginal den-
sities from the corresponding estimated conditional wage distributions. The dotted line is
the outcome of a QR based procedure, whilst the solid one is the outcome of an HF based
approach. The total wage gap is computed by taking the difference between the log male
wage and the log female wage at each percentile of the corresponding estimated marginal
distribution. The two lines are very close to each other and they overlap for most of the
wage support. The lines at the top of Figure 2 plot instead the wage gap after that gen-
der differences in observed characteristics are taken into account. They show the gender
wage gap that would have prevailed if women had had the same distribution of observed
characteristics as men, but still paid as women.
Three points are worthy being noted. First, the two techniques for decomposing wage
25The same kind of heterogeneity, indeed, has been found for Italian unemployment by, among others,
Bertola and Garibaldi (2003)
19gaps display very similar results and it would not matter so much whether the MM de-
composition after QR or the HF based decomposition were used. Second, the pay gap,
once gender differences in the distribution of labour market characteristics are taken into
account, becomes larger across all the wage distribution. As it can be seen in Table 7, men
are paid 15.7% more than women at the median of the distribution and 17.3%(18%) at the
top(bottom) of the distribution.26 Third, it follows that if women had had the same returns as
men but their own distribution of observed characteristics, they would have received higher
wages across all the wage distribution, especially at the top (see the lines at the bottom of
Figure 2).
Figure 2: Gender Wage Gap Decomposition without Selection Correction: QR approach
(Dotted Line) and HF Approach (Solid Line)
Note: The grey areas are the 95% conﬁdence intervals, computed by bootstrapping the results 999 times.
We next investigate the effect of sample selection into the work force on the estimated
wage distributions, on the counterfactual distributions, and, thereby, on the gender wage
gaps. Figure 3 depicts the total wage gap (lower curve) and the gap if men and women had
the same distribution of observed characteristics (upper curve). Once we take into account
26Note that the bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals become wider at the tails of the wage distribution. Since
the piecewise constant wage baseline hazards are speciﬁed by dividing the wage support in many equally
spaced intervals, at the tails there are fewer observations per each piece. This implies that the wage density
functions and, thereby, the wage gaps are estimated less precisely at the extremities of the wage support.
20sample selection, the total wage gap becomes wider across all the distribution. There is
evidence therefore that women are overall and strongly more positively selected into the
work force than men: women that stay out of employment are those that would have got the
lowest returns from the market work with an higher probability than that of men.
The upper curve of Figure 3 shows that, even if men and women had identical distri-
butions of characteristics and after taking into account selection into the work force, the
gender pay gap persists and is even wider. The last three columns of Table 7 report the point
estimates and conﬁdence intervals of the gender pay gap at selected percentiles of the wage
distribution. The pay gap is always signiﬁcantly different from zero and is characterized
by a U-shape. It has maximum at the 5th percentile, where men’s wages are 25.6% higher
than women’s. Then, it decreases and at the 25th percentile it is equal to 19%. Thereafter, it
monotonically increases and, at the 95th percentile, it is equal to 24.5%.
Figure 3: Gender Wage Gap Decomposition with Selection Correction
Note: The grey areas are the 95% conﬁdence intervals, computed by bootstrapping the results 999 times.
The U-shape of the gender wage gap suggests that in Italy there are both sticky ﬂoors
and glass ceilings. The glass ceiling and, especially, sticky ﬂoor phenomena become more
evident once sample selection is taken into account. Table 8 contrasts measures of sticky
ﬂoors and glass ceilings, computed from the ratios between the gender gaps at different per-
centiles, with and without sample selection correction. The gender gap at the 5th percentile
is 1.14 larger than the one at the median when sample selection is not taken into account.
21Table 7: Wage Gap if Women had Male Characteristics but Women’s
Returns, with and without Selection Correction
Without selection correction With selection correction
Percentiles Wage gap (%) 95% conﬁdence interval Wage gap (%) 95% conﬁdence interval
5 .179 .128 .240 .256 .185 .326
10 .161 .121 .201 .219 .175 .261
25 .141 .119 .163 .190 .159 .221
50 .157 .134 .180 .214 .183 .245
75 .167 .135 .195 .231 .189 .270
90 .175 .134 .215 .242 .197 .288
95 .173 .113 .235 .245 .187 .306
Table 8: Sticky Floor and Glass Ceiling Measures
Without selection correction With selection correction
Sticky ﬂoor measured by
5/50(a) 1.142 1.197
5/25(b) 1.268 1.346
Glass ceiling measured by
95/50(c) 1.108 1.149
95/75(d) 1.042 1.065
(a) The sticky ﬂoor is measured as the ratio between the 5th percentile wage gap and the 50th percentile wage gap.
(b) The sticky ﬂoor is measured as the ratio between the 5th percentile wage gap and the 25th percentile wage gap.
(c) The glass ceiling is measured as the ratio between the 95th percentile wage gap and the 50th percentile wage gap.
(d) The glass ceiling is measured as the ratio between the 95th percentile wage gap and the 75th percentile wage gap.
This ﬁgure becomes 1.35 when sample selection is controlled for. Such evidence suggests
the existence of obstacles for women in particular at the bottom of the wage distribution.
3.4 Goodness-of-Fit
Given the mixture of parametric and non-parametric assumptions we impose to estimate
conditional wage distributions, it might be important to assess the ability of the model in
providing quantitative predictions of the statistics of primary interest. We therefore check
the goodness-of-ﬁt of the model by contrasting empirical aspects of the data with those
predicted by model simulations. The simulation algorithm is described in Appendix A-2.
We focus on three aspects: work participation, male and female marginal wage distributions,
and the gender wage gap over these distributions.
Table 9 displays, by gender, actual and simulated work participation rates and selected
percentiles of the marginal wage distribution. Figure 4 focuses instead on the actual and
predicted raw gender wage gap over the wage distribution. The goodness-of-ﬁt can easily
be checked by verifying whether the empirical statistics lie within the conﬁdence intervals
of the simulated ones.
Work participation is perfectly predicted by our models, both for men and women. The
model ﬁts also very well the empirical percentiles of the wage distributions. For women,
22Table 9: Goodness-of-Fit: Work Participation and Wage Marginal Distribution Con-
ditional on Participating by Gender
Women Men
Actual Simulated 95% conﬁdence interval Actual Simulated 95% conﬁdence interval
Work participation .541 .532 .511 .552 .877 .865 .847 .879
Percentiles of wage
distribution in e
5 4.71 4.75 4.56 4.94 5.18 5.30 5.12 5.48
10 5.48 5.50 5.33 5.67 5.89 5.97 5.85 6.07
15 5.99 5.99 5.83 6.12 6.33 6.39 6.25 6.51
20 6.32 6.31 6.19 6.45 6.69 6.75 6.64 6.86
25 6.63 6.63 6.51 6.75 7.03 7.09 6.98 7.21
30 6.92 6.92 6.79 7.05 7.33 7.39 7.29 7.49
35 7.24 7.21 7.08 7.35 7.59 7.67 7.55 7.79
40 7.53 7.51 7.37 7.65 7.94 7.99 7.86 8.11
45 7.87 7.82 7.66 7.97 8.26 8.33 8.19 8.47
50 8.21 8.15 7.99 8.31 8.62 8.66 8.52 8.79
55 8.59 8.49 8.32 8.68 8.97 9.00 8.86 9.14
60 8.99 8.87 8.69 9.06 9.38 9.38 9.22 9.54
65 9.40 9.27 9.08 9.46 9.80 9.79 9.63 9.97
70 9.90 9.71 9.49 9.95 10.30 10.30 10.09 10.49
75 10.50 10.29 10.02 10.54 11.01 10.92 10.67 11.17
80 11.21 10.92 10.64 11.21 11.77 11.64 11.37 11.90
85 12.21 11.82 11.44 12.20 12.65 12.52 12.23 12.86
90 13.67 13.16 12.66 13.67 13.87 13.74 13.39 14.13
95 16.62 15.66 14.92 16.47 16.48 16.06 15.45 16.72
Note: Actual frequencies lying in the 95% conﬁdence interval of the simulated frequencies are in bold.
Figure 4: Goodness-of-Fit: Gender Wage Gap
Note: The grey area is the 95% conﬁdence intervals, computed by bootstrapping the results 999 times.
23the model tends to slightly underpredict high percentiles of the wage distribution. However,
the size of the misalignment is small and the ability of the model to predict female wage
distribution is nonetheless very good. The ability of the model in replicating the data is
conﬁrmed by Figure 4, which shows that the empirical wage gap over the wage distribution
always lies within the 95% conﬁdence interval of the simulated one and is furthermore very
close to the point predictions.
4 Conclusions
A sizeable gender gap in employment rates is observed in many countries. Non-random
sample selection into the workforce might be a potentially important issue when evaluating
gender wage gaps. This is especially true if those women that stay out of employment are
the ones who would get the lowest returns from work. If so, we would underestimate the
gender wage gap compared to the case in which women and men had the same propensity
to be at work.
On the basis of these considerations, this paper is aimed at offering and implement-
ing a ﬂexible estimator of distribution functions in the presence of covariates and sample
selection. We have operated within the HF framework proposed by Donald et al. (2000)
and improved upon them, in that we incorporate in the model sample selection. We have
described a simulation algorithm to decompose the gender pay gap across the wage distribu-
tion into the effect due to different distributions of individual characteristics and to different
returns on those characteristics, once gender differences in work force selection are taken
into account.
Our approach has been illustrated by investigating the gender wage gap in Italy, a coun-
try persistently characterized by a large gender gap in terms of work participation. The
empirical analysis, based on 2004–2005 EU-SILC panel data, shows that women are paid
less than men. Not controlling for sample selection yields gender wage gaps across the
wage distributions that are in line with those recently found for Italy, e.g. Arulampalam et
al. (2007) and Gannon et al. (2007).
We ﬁnd that gender wage gap widens when we control for non-random sample selection
into the work force, even if the distribution of observed characteristics is the same across
genders. There is therefore evidence that women are more strongly and positively selected
into the work force than men: women that stay out of employment are those that would
have got the lowest returns from the labour market with an higher probability than that of
comparable men. It is also found that, when we control for sample selection, the gender
wage gap becomes wider at the top, where it jumps from 17.3% to 24.5%, and especially at
the bottom of the wage distribution, where it moves from 17.9% to 25.6%.
We now speculate on the possible explanations that can be drawn from the fact that in
Italy the sticky ﬂoor phenomenon becomes more evident when sample selection is taken
into account. This is consistent with explanations based on the interaction between work
24and family. Italy has a relatively not well developed system of work/family reconciliation
policies,27 characterized by short maternity leave, poorly paid optional parental leave, and
limited part-time jobs opportunities (Del Boca, 2002; Del Boca et al., 2005; Del Boca and
Pasqua, 2005). This institutional setting makes Italian women less attached to the labour
market and more likely to commit to family than to career than comparable men, especially
at the bottom of the wage distribution where ﬁnancial constraints are more likely to be bind-
ing. This also suggests that family-friendly policies might increase the female attachment
to the work force, especially at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Note that similar reasoning might also explain why the gender pay gap widens, even if
less evidently, also at the top of the distribution. It might be that the absence of a structured
child care makes Italian women at the top jobs more oriented towards less demanding jobs
than the male counterpart.
Other factors might however explain our ﬁndings. There could be, for instance, socio-
logical barrier for women to be at work, like social norms according to which man’s career
has the priority. Then, only those women with relatively high wage characteristics might be
able to overtake the threshold imposed by the social norm and enter the work force, whilst
those that have relatively low wage characteristics remain out of the work force.
Appendix
A-1 Further Estimation Results: Marginal Wage Distributions and
Work Participation
The attributes of the estimated marginal wage distributions for men and women are reported in Table
A-1. The values of these distributions at selected percentiles conﬁrm the existence of a gender
gap: the ﬁgures for male component are higher than the ones for females through the overall pay
distribution.
Scale, skewness, and kurtosis give insights on the scale and shape of the wage distributions.
Moreprecisely, thescaleisameasureofthe“statisticaldispersion”oftheprobabilitydensityfunction
(pdf). If it is large, the distribution will be more spread out; if it is small, it will be more concentrated.
Both the scales of the estimated distributions are small, suggesting more concentrated pdf between
the 25th and the 75th percentiles of wage distributions.
The skewness is instead a measure of the asymmetry of the pdf. A negative skewness implies
longer left tail and the mass of the distribution is concentrated on the right of the ﬁgure. A positive
skewness implies longer right tail and the mass of the distribution is concentrated on the left of the
ﬁgure. The distributions in Table A-1 are therefore left-skewed, but the values are however low.
Finally, the kurtosis is a measure of the peakedness of the pdf. The Normal distribution has
kurtosis equal to 0. The Laplace distribution has excess kurtosis equal to 3. In our case, both for
27See the OECD’s (2001, § 4) work/family reconciliation composite index for a comparison between Italy
and other OECD countries.
25men and women, the excess kurtosis is very close to 2, about the same peakedness as the hyperbolic
secant distribution.
Table A-1: Attributes of the Estimated Marginal Wage Distributions for Men and
Women
Men Women
5th percentile 5.269 4.381
10th percentile 5.950 5.073
25th percentile 7.100 6.269
50th percentile 8.682 7.646
75th percentile 10.977 9.648
90th percentile 13.803 12.372




(a) Denote Qp the wage corresponding to quantile p, then scale is deﬁned as (Q0:75   Q0:25)=Q0:50.
(b) Denote Qp the wage corresponding to quantile p, then skewness is deﬁned as (Q0:75 Q0:25 2Q0:50)=(Q0:75+
Q0:25).
(c) Denote Qp the wage corresponding to quantile p, then kurtosis is deﬁned as (Q0:90   Q0:10)=(Q0:75   Q0:25).
Figure A-1 plots the marginal wage distributions described so far. Here, we can see a clear wage
gap across the distribution, apart from the top. The gap between the wage distribution for men and
women, indeed, becomes narrow from the 90th percentile onwards.
Finally, Table A-2 reports the estimation results of the discrete mixture logit model for the prob-
ability of being employed. The results are in line with the expectations. The probability of being
employed is increasing with the education attainment and is lower in the Centre and especially in
the South of Italy. Family structure and married status have opposite effects on work participation
between men and women: married (wo)men have a (lower)higher probability of being employed and
work participation is increasing in the number of children for men and decreasing in the number of
children for women. The number of household members reduces the employment probability both
for men and women. Men living in a highly urbanized area are less likely to work, whereas whether
or not a woman lives in an urbanized area has little impact on the propensity to be at work. It is
interesting to note that young men are less likely to be employed than old men, whilst young women
are more likely to be at work than old women.
A-2 The Simulation with regard to the Goodness-of-Fit
Predictions are computed by implementing the following simulation algorithm for men and women:
1. Draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming normality around the point estimates b  with a
variance-covariance matrix equal to the estimated one.
2. Generate N individuals by drawing N times: i) a vector z of covariates from the empirical
distribution of covariates; ii) unobserved characteristics from the estimated distribution of un-
observed heterogeneity b G.
26Table A-2: Estimation Results of the Logit Model in
(6) for Labour Market Participation
Men Women
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Bad health -1.562*** .203 -.205 .133
Married 3.576*** .347 -1.499*** .154
City -.938*** .180 -.192 .117
Education – Reference: None, elementary, or lower secondary
Upper secondary 1.739*** .209 4.310*** .353
Post secondary or tertiary 2.440*** .306 5.006*** .371
Age – Reference: [45;55]
[25;35) -.837*** .268 .409*** .162
[35;45) -.395 .262 .198 .143
Area of residence – Reference: North
Centre -.801*** .258 -1.475*** .203
South -3.372*** .300 -4.723*** .274
Number of children by age
[0   3) years old .937*** .286 -.907*** .181
[3   6) years old .301 .297 -.435*** .179
[6   12) years old .434** .217 -.190 .125
Number of household members -.232*** .076 -.294*** .055
Year 2004 .310 .241 .427*** .170
Individual heterogeneity distribution
Location of the support points
"1 5.857*** .458 -3.434*** .436
"2 -2.458*** .500 6.441*** .351
Logistic transform coefﬁcients of the probability masses
1 -.031 .050 -.737** .330
2 -2.617*** .520 -.357*** .125
3 -1.301*** .147 .130 .106
4 .000 – .000 –
Resulting probability masses
p1 = :419 p1 = :145
p2 = :032 p2 = :211
p3 = :118 p3 = :343
p4 = :431 p4 = :301
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ***
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
27Figure A-1: Estimated Marginal Distributions for Men and Women
Note: The grey areas are the 95% conﬁdence intervals, computed by bootstrapping the results 999 times.
3. Simulate work participation by a lottery based on the predicted probability of work partici-
pation. More in details, for i = 1;:::;N we draw i from a standard uniform distribution.
If (z0
itb F + b "i) > i, individual i participates. Otherwise, she does not participate and her
simulation is halted.
4. Simulate the wage distribution over the subsample of participating individuals. For each base-
line wage interval [wj 1;wj) with j = 1;:::;70, we compute the predicted conditional prob-
ability of getting a wage within that interval from the following theoretical conditional proba-
bility:
Pr(wj 1  Wt < wjjWt  wj 1;xit;vi) = 1   exp[ (wjjxit;vi)]:
For i = 1;:::;N and for j = 1;:::;J we draw ij from a standard uniform distribution.
Starting from j = 1, if the predicted probability 1   exp[ b (w1jxit;b vi)] > i1, individual i
is assigned a random wage in [w0;w1). If not, repeat the lottery for the next wage baseline
segment. The lottery for individual i is stopped when the inequality is satisﬁed.
5. Repeat steps 1 to 4 R = 999 times.
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